

CHAPTER FOUR

Scholarship Defined and Embodied

Scholarship is a complex practice involving many different kinds of activity and ways of thinking. Often scholarship is (mis)defined in fairly simple terms. As a corrective, we propose a threefold definition of scholarship that includes analytic, strategic, and empathic modes of reflection. In addition to the diversity that exists within the scholarly enterprise itself, a range of other factors surround our work and shape our lives as scholars, including concerns of ethics, academic etiquette, personal motivation, and vocation.

Many discussions of Christian scholarship falter because they presuppose a definition of scholarship that is not complex enough to comprehend all the different kinds of activity that nestle together under the rubric of scholarship. Many scholars seem to assume they know instinctively what scholarship is and what it is not. If they cannot put that definition neatly into words, they would still claim to know scholarship when they see it. But this intuitive approach to scholarship almost always produces a skewed view of what scholarship entails. In this regard, scholars are no different from everybody else. People see the world through the lens of their own experiences and understand best those things with which they are most familiar.

Thus, most scholars are prone to define scholarship in terms that are amenable to their own fields of academic expertise but that are not necessarily equally applicable to other areas of scholarly reflection and activity. Professors in the so-called hard sciences still often continue to believe that the scholarship of their humanities-oriented colleagues is little more than opinionated fluff; humanities professors in turn

often wonder if any of their scientific colleagues ever read books and reflect on their meanings. As C. P. Snow pointed out long ago, the humanities and the sciences can be equally oblivious to and dismissive of each other's world of scholarship.¹ Then there is the question of scholarship as it relates to subjects like business, health care, or engineering. Experts in these fields often view their scientific and humanities associates as irredeemably impractical, which may only be fair since the science and humanities professors often view the business, health, and engineering faculty as not genuinely "real" scholars at all. Add to this mix social scientists and visual and performing artists and the picture becomes even more complicated. How does the notion of scholarship apply to all these different forms of academic study?

In recent years, several new definitions have been put forward that allow more kinds of academic activity to appropriately be labeled scholarship. Perhaps the most widely discussed alternative is Ernest Boyer's proposal that posits four different and distinct types of scholarship: discovery, integration, application, and teaching.² His model has been widely endorsed as a helpful corrective to past practices. Few in the academy would advocate a return to the pre-Boyer days when the only valued scholarship was original research undertaken in very tightly defined fields of disciplinary expertise and disseminated through publication in scholarly journals or university press monographs.

Boyer's definition does place a high value on the traditional scholarship of discovery, but it also recognizes that other kinds of academic work ought rightly to be counted as scholarship and not be relegated to some supposedly lesser domain. The goal is not to water down the definition of scholarship so that everyone can claim to be a scholar but rather to acknowledge the diversity of tasks that are naturally and legitimately involved in good scholarship. Good scholarship means discovering or creating new bits of truth (discovery scholarship); it means understanding how those new bits of knowledge relate to other fields of academic inquiry (integration scholarship); it means being able to explain how those new items of information apply to situations in the "real world" (applied scholarship); and it means being able to explain your work to others who know relatively little about your field of expertise (the scholarship of teaching). Those are enormous demands, and it is only reasonable to expect that scholars will possess different levels of skill in different areas. However, colleges and universities need people with all four skills, and Boyer wanted to make sure that all four dimensions of scholarship were equally supported and encouraged by institutions of higher learning. To him, it made no sense to force everyone through the sieve of discovery scholarship in order to get tenure if what colleges and universities really needed was a balanced mix of all four aspects of the scholarly task.³

Another proposal that has garnered attention in recent years is Howard Gardner's notion of "multiple intelligences."⁴ Gardner suggests that human beings have at least seven, and perhaps eight or more, distinct kinds of intel-

ligence. His first listing included linguistic intelligence, logical-mathematical intelligence, spatial intelligence (the ability to perceive things in three-dimensional imagination), bodily-kinesthetic intelligence (the ability to do things with one's body including dance, athletics, and general skill in craftsmanship), musical intelligence, interpersonal intelligence (skills of leadership and effective group interaction), and intrapersonal intelligence (self-awareness and the ability to react adaptively to new environments). Gardner later added the category of naturalist intelligence ("expertise in the recognition and classification of the numerous species—the flora and fauna—of his or her environment") and suggested existential intelligence (intelligence related to "ultimate" concerns) might also qualify.⁵ He argues that these separate kinds of intelligence are rooted in different kinds of brain activity, that they evolved on the basis of different evolutionary needs, and that they each possess their own distinct symbol systems. Using this sevenfold categorization of intelligence, it would be possible to develop a corresponding sevenfold definition of scholarship.

Reaction to Gardner's proposal has been mixed. Some have welcomed his expansion of the notion of intelligence, while others have rejected it as simply one more sign of the dumbing-down of the academy. Nevertheless, Gardner's notion of multiple intelligences implies that scholars necessarily bring different insights and abilities to their common tasks. While Boyer's division of the work of scholarship is functional, involving four different kinds of activity, Gardner's division of intelligence is more essential: people perceive, interpret, and interact with the world around them in different ways based on the different configurations of skills and abilities that define them as persons. While these differences may sometimes line up along Boyer's functional lines (e.g., some kinds of intelligence may predispose a person more for the scholarship of discovery than the scholarship of application), Gardner's proposal suggests that scholars with different intelligences will approach similar tasks in different ways. Thus it is a difference in the kind of intelligence (not degree of intelligence) that naturally directs one scholar to become a qualitative researcher and another to become a quantitative researcher. Similarly, one kind of intelligence may lead a person interested in the study of human beings toward psychology, while a different kind of intelligence may lead another person toward sociology.

While both Boyer's and Gardner's views have been validly criticized, their pluralistic definitions of scholarship have helped advance the conversation. Scholarship can and does take many different forms, and new definitions of scholarship must take that diversity into account. At the very least, Boyer and Gardner disabuse us of the notion that any simple definition of scholarship can apply equally to all disciplines or to all fields of research, analysis, and creative expression.

The recognition that scholarship comes in different forms is not only significant for the academy in a general sense but also has immense significance

for the notion of Christian scholarship. In many discussions of Christian scholarship the implicit assumption has been that the same approach should be applied everywhere. Historically this has been especially true of the integration model's presupposition that each and every discipline is ultimately defined by the philosophical worldview that underlies it. Those committed to this approach assume that Christian scholars are supposed to root out the foundational worldviews of their disciplines and then subject those philosophical presuppositions to a comparative analysis with Christian faith. However, worldviews are extremely difficult to unearth in many disciplines, and in some cases the search seems like an exercise in futility. Does chemistry really have that kind of underlying worldview? Is music really defined by a foundational epistemology and metaphysics? Do all historians have worldview axes to grind, or are some historians just detail-oriented, pragmatic folks trying to figure out what happened in the past? Does mathematics entail an entire worldview, or is it simply a gorgeously elaborated mental construction that lets us examine the world in a host of fascinating ways we would not otherwise have at our disposal? The integration model has always seemed a bit forced when applied to many of the disciplines.

If we pushed other models of Christian scholarship in a similar way we would probably find that they, too, do not mix equally well with the various disciplines or foci of academic inquiry. The Lutheran view, for example, stresses the independence of the disciplines, but surely this kind of independence has its limitations, especially when moral issues like cloning, economic injustice, or racism come to the fore. The Anabaptist perspective on scholarship has a different kind of unevenness. Anabaptism's suspicious posture vis-à-vis political power and violence predisposes Anabaptists to engage in practice-oriented scholarship, and the same disposition may well divert Anabaptist academic energy away from the constructive exploration of new fields of research, especially in subject areas where the moral relevance of such study is not immediately evident. The Catholic model, for all its strengths, has not always produced the results one would expect. Its ecclesial emphasis may lead Catholic scholars to simply relegate any specifically Catholic reflection on life and learning to the theologians while they pursue their own nontheological disciplines in a manner identical to all their secular peers. Wesleyans and Pentecostals have their limitations, too. Their commitment to the importance of human experience may well make them less naturally prone to reflect on the significance of Christian faith in disciplines that are more abstract and logical in orientation and less directly connected with human nature. Other traditions could be discussed in similar terms, but the general conclusion would remain the same: no tradition of Christian scholarship possesses strengths that apply equally well to all forms of scholarship.

The focus of this chapter, however, is not primarily on Christian faith but on questions related to scholarship itself in all its many varieties. How can we

best define the concept of scholarship? Are there significantly different styles or modes of scholarship? In what ways is our academic work shaped by various personal or interpersonal considerations? Only after we have thought about these questions can we discuss the complex ways that faith and different kinds of scholarship overlap and interact in our lives as academicians and persons of faith.

Scholarship Defined

Given the preceding discussion, it may seem foolhardy to propose our own short definition of scholarship, but the task is unavoidable. What is scholarship in the most general sense of the term? How can scholarship be defined in a way that applies, with some degree of fairness, to all the academic disciplines across the board? The need is for a definition of scholarship that makes as much sense to the scientists as it does to humanities faculty, and that is also attuned to the different kinds of scholarly activities undertaken by colleagues in the more practical and professional disciplines and also in the visual and performance arts. Our proposed definition is: *Scholarship is disciplined and creative reflection on the natural and humanly constructed world disseminated for the benefit of others and judged by appropriate standards of excellence.*

Human beings may be curious and creative by nature, but scholarship involves the honing of those natural skills into disciplined excellence. Scholarship involves effort: thought, practice, creative energy, the risk of failure, and the joy of success. Some of this effort is in a sense preparatory, focusing on the development of necessary skills and the acquisition of necessary knowledge for our chosen fields of interest. But on top of that, scholarship requires the hard work of researching one's projects, carefully developing one's own perspective, and then sharing those new, intelligently crafted insights with others. All of this takes time, and it also requires creativity. Sheer work alone does not make one a scholar; scholarship necessarily mixes sustained effort with creative insight. Take away the hard work and all we have is effluent self-expression; take away the creativity and all that is left is the cataloging or repetition of what others already know.

The point at which such reflection on the world crosses the threshold from competent "school work" to real scholarship is fuzzy, but the distinction is crucial. People who teach at colleges and universities know this well. They have all seen some, but only some, of their students progress from being good assignment completers to being scholarly colleagues. Even after a person has become an accomplished scholar, this distinction continues to apply in the sense that only some of our work takes the form of scholarship. We all know that being a member of the local Republican or Democratic county committee is political work, but it is not political scholarship. Performing Beethoven for

a university fundraiser is artistic work, but it would not usually be considered artistic scholarship. Preaching a sermon can be theological work, but sermons are not typically examples of theological scholarship. Scholarship is not merely reflecting on the world in an academic manner, it is disseminating that work in a way that is intended to enrich the academic work of others and invite the critique of one's peers.

The primary task of scholarship is to "pay attention" to the world—or, at least, to some part of the world—with a sense of focus, care, and intensity that nonscholars lack. But it is not simply paying attention that matters. Scholars also reflect on the different ways they pay attention to the world; they are methodologically self-conscious. Attention to the world can mean many things. For some, understanding in and of itself is sufficient. For others—artists, poets, musicians—creative response has to be part of the package. For still others paying attention means intervening, encouraging certain outcomes and discouraging others. All of that is part of scholarship.

No one can pay attention to everything; time does not allow it, and limitations of skill and training prevent it. The division of the academy into various disciplines and other focused fields of study is an admission of that fact. Such a division of labor necessitates that scholarship as a whole will always be communal. Because we cannot pay attention to everything—not even everything in our own specialized areas of expertise—we need to rely on the insights and attentive honesty of others. Therefore even though scholarship is often intensely personal, driven by our own need to understand, influence, or creatively interact with the world, the attention we lavish on the world is also always undertaken in relationship with, and in some sense on behalf of, others. The work of scholarship embeds every scholar in a complex web of social relations: some aspects of that web are generational (e.g., the teacher-student relationship), others are collegial (e.g., relations with scholarly peers and friends), and still others are respectful but confrontational (e.g., scholarly relations with those with whom we disagree). And those relations are all necessary to the work of scholarship. Solipsistic reflection that never allows others to react to our work is not scholarship but merely idiosyncratic musing. True scholarship always aims to enrich, expand, critique, correct, and inspire humanity's public and common store of knowledge, wisdom, and creative genius.

Three Styles of Scholarship

While scholarship can take many different forms, three broad categories cover most of the territory, dividing scholarship along the lines of ideas, actions, and feelings. Analytic styles of scholarship are idea-oriented, seeking to construct mental maps or models of the way reality seems to be put together. Strategic styles of scholarship are action-oriented, hoping to understand the world in

order to change it in some way. Finally, empathic styles of scholarship are feeling-oriented, focusing on the need to connect with others and the world in ways that are more subjective and aesthetic.

These three modes or styles of academic reflection are not inimical to each other; in fact, they often blend together. Thus, however empathic artists may be, they sometimes need to be analytic in the way they view their own work and the work of others, and invariably they need to be strategic in the way they execute their aesthetic projects. Physicists are perhaps the most quintessentially analytic of all scholars, but they often have strategic reasons for pursuing one project rather than another, and at times they appeal to blatantly aesthetic norms in order to explain their preference for one theory over another, saying the preferred theory is simpler or more symmetrical or more elegant. Engineers, who are first and foremost strategic thinkers, also frequently employ analytic and empathic/aesthetic modes of thought. Similar things could be said about virtually every field of study. Usually one of the three modes of scholarship predominates, but the other two modes are rarely absent from the mix.

Analytic Scholarship

The goal of analytic scholarship is to dissect reality, dividing it into its component parts and then putting it back together again to see how it works. The item under scrutiny might be the ecosystem of a swamp or the sensuous lines of a sculpture. Analytic scholarship has a role to play in virtually every discipline. We analyze plants and poems, historical events and fossil records, the workings of both finely crafted machines and sloppily run societies. Some analytic scholarship is more linguistic (or qualitative) in character, some is more mathematical (or quantitative), and a good deal of analytic scholarship is a mixture of these two. Nevertheless, the goal remains the same: to develop new cognitive models or maps that explain or explore different parts of reality with depth and finesse. Analytic thinking seeks understanding as an end in itself; nothing necessarily has to be done with that information other than to enjoy its well-crafted explication of some aspect of the world.

Scholarship that centers on analysis tends naturally to distance the scholar from the subjects he or she studies. Because of that, much analytic scholarship feels quite "modern"; it has a certain Enlightenment aura to it. Some would also argue that analytic scholarship is decidedly male in its desire to methodologically pry objective knowledge out of the subjective messiness of the world. Feminist and postmodern theorists have accordingly, and perhaps rightly, criticized analytic scholarship for these traits. But it is important to remember that analytic scholarship can claim a heritage that is much older than the Enlightenment—going back at least as far as Aristotle—and that analytic scholarship at its best has no desire to exercise any kind of patriarchal control over

the materials it studies. Certain forms of analytic scholarship may border on being hyperobjectivistic or may seem almost immorally neutral on matters that practically cry out for ethical commentary, but this is not necessarily problematic as long as strategic and empathic modes of scholarship are recognized as necessary complements to analytic thinking. The objectivity of analytic scholarship becomes problematic only when the validity of other modes of thinking is minimized or denied.

Analytic thinking as a distinct mode of scholarship is quite easy to identify, and it is almost surely the most common form of scholarship produced by college and university professors. In fact, when something is "academic" in popular parlance, it usually means it is analytic: an explanation of how things work with no plan or desire to apply that knowledge to any particular problem in the real world. Given the pragmatic orientation of American culture, it is no surprise that this kind of scholarship for its own sake—the analysis of literature, history, human consciousness, rocks, and microbes just to understand those items better—has sometimes been pilloried as close to worthless. The pithy phrase "the paralysis of analysis" sums it up. But academicians know that analytic scholarship is far from worthless. In fact, analytic thinking is to some degree the foundation for all other forms of scholarship. Without the ability to analyze something so that one knows how it works, strategic thinking operates in a void. Similarly, without some ability objectively to analyze shapes, sounds, colors, and relations, the arts would collapse into undisciplined expression. Analysis is and always will be a critical component of virtually all scholarship.

Strategic Scholarship

In contrast to analytic thinking, strategic scholarship focuses on understanding the world in order to reshape it. Strategic scholarship is about redirecting developments, rearranging the way things are put together, and realigning the connections that define the fabric of the world. It is a problem-solving mode of reflection. This is the kind of thinking Karl Marx had in mind when he said the goal of philosophy was not to understand the world but to change it. Strategic thinking is not, however, peculiar only to leftists or socialists. Within the academy, numerous applied or professional programs (e.g., engineering, business, teaching, nursing) make this mode of scholarship central, but all disciplines involve strategic thinking to some degree. Artists need to strategize about which techniques will best help them produce the works of art they have already imagined in their minds, and historians need to be able to place themselves imaginatively in the strategic shoes of the people and movements they study from the past. Every discipline involves strategy in some way, if only in the ways we plan to disseminate what we have discovered or created.

Strategic scholarship is often dependent to some degree on analysis. One

needs at least minimal knowledge about how something works before trying to reprogram it. But strategic scholarship is never wholly dependent on analysis; it is not merely the application of analysis to the real world. Strategic scholarship embodies a different way of knowing. It is the difference between knowing why a national economy is in decline and understanding how to fix it. It is the difference between being a foreign policy analyst and making foreign policy. It is the difference between knowing how the AIDS virus works and figuring out how to kill it. It is the difference between most sociological scholarship and most scholarship of social work. The point is that some aspects of the world are almost impossible to understand until one has gained some strategic familiarity with them. Strategic scholarship can be the foundation for analytic scholarship, just as things can work the other way around. One recent example of this is found in Stephen Wolfram's book *A New Kind of Science* (2002), in which he explains how his development of the computer program *Mathematica*—an almost purely strategic scholarly project—slowly let him see many aspects of the world (including biology, sociology, art, and philosophy in addition to mathematics, physics, and computer science) in an entirely new analytic light.⁶

Traditional liberal arts schools have sometimes placed "pure" analytic scholarship on a pedestal and have relegated "applied" or strategic scholarship to a lower rank within the academic pecking order. Conversely, strategic scholars have sometimes caricatured liberal arts people as bumbling, absent-minded, ivory-tower intellectuals who could "never make it in the real world." Both stereotypes are wrong. It is a mistake to pit analytic studies against strategic studies; they are naturally complementary and frequently overlapping modes of reflection. Students need both kinds of skills, the world needs both kinds of thinkers, and the academy ought to honor both kinds of scholarship.

Empathic Scholarship

Analytic and strategic forms of scholarship are both predicated on a certain degree of separation between the scholar and the subject matter the scholar studies. A third mode of scholarship, empathic scholarship, adopts an alternative approach, seeking to narrow the gap between the knower and the known as much as possible. Empathic scholarship rejects the objectivization of the things we study, seeking to think with the subject rather than merely about the subject of inquiry. Empathic scholarship seeks to elicit from the world the answers to questions that already exist in the world rather than prodding the world with foreign questions to see how it might react to new stimuli or how it might be redirected into new patterns of behavior. It aims to understand the aesthetic feel of reality without needing to control it. Empathic scholarship seeks to fold itself into the rhythm of a society or an ecosystem, envelop itself in the mood of a work of art, or soak up the character of another human being.

This is Annie Dillard wonder-at-the-world kind of scholarship, rather than the analytic sociology of Peter Berger or the applied economics of Alan Greenspan. Empathic scholarship agrees with Charles Taylor that "an epistemology which privileges disengagement and control isn't self-evidently right."⁷ There are other more subtle, more instinctive ways of knowing that provide us with access to certain aspects of reality that would otherwise be unknowable.

Empathic thinkers can often see or make connections between seemingly disparate and unconnected bits and pieces of reality that others cannot see or make. Poets, artists, and musicians tend to have highly developed skills in this area—in a sense, they have to be empathic to do their work—but the giants in many of the disciplines have incorporated some degree of empathic thinking into their work. The Nobel prize-winning biologist and medical researcher Barbara McClintock, whose biography is aptly entitled *A Feeling for the Organism*, made this notion central to her understanding of science. And it is perhaps not inconsequential that McClintock is a woman. Many feminist scholars have suggested that scholarship as a whole needs to pay more attention to empathy, if for no other reason than to serve as an antidote for the so-called "male" desire to control the object one studies. In the end, however, empathic scholarship is not so much linked to gender as it is to being human. More than any other mode of scholarship, empathic thinking acknowledges our creaturely limitations and our dependence on—indeed our essential embeddedness within—the natural and human environments in which we live. It is attention to the empathic that adds human (and humane) depth to our analytic and strategic reflection on the world.

Some might take our use of the term "empathic" to refer not to a different kind of thinking but to a certain moral quality that might or might not be layered on top of our real scholarship as a nice little something extra. It would be good to be polite while also being smart. Others might think immediately of warm and fuzzy classrooms when they hear the word empathic. In their minds empathic scholarship morphs almost instantaneously into empathetic teaching. Empathy can certainly be a boon in the classroom, but that is not what empathic thinking is about. In our perspective, empathic thinking is a form of serious scholarship that allows one to get at certain aspects of reality that could not be understood in any other way. It is subtle and subjective, to be sure, but vast dimensions of reality are subtle and subjective, and we will miss them entirely if we reject the practice of empathic scholarship. The philosopher Alfred North Whitehead understood this principle well when he wrote in the early twentieth century that "subjective ways of feeling are not merely receptive of the data as alien facts; they clothe the dry bones with the flesh of a real being, emotional, purposive, appreciative."⁸ The contemporary philosopher Martha Nussbaum would agree and add one further twist: love is often a necessary element. She says some knowledge simply cannot be gained through methodological coercion. Rather than being the result of intellectual grasping,

some knowledge can only come through "intellectual vulnerability and receptivity." It can only be received as a gift that transcends the solely intellectual and that requires feeling and commitment to be understood. She calls this "love's knowledge."⁹

But perhaps the best way to demonstrate the power of empathic scholarship is to illustrate it in various disciplinary contexts. The companion essay to this chapter written by Susanna Bede Caroselli does just this with regard to the field of art, evaluating what one might be able to glean from an empathic or "instinctive response" to art versus the more analytic or "considered response" that is typical of the trained art historian. An example in the human sciences is found in the work of the Harvard psychologist Robert Coles. One of Coles's main fields of specialization is the moral development of children. Rather than undertaking various quantitative programs of research, however, Coles simply talks to children and seeks to understand their moral visions of the world as they themselves describe them. And his findings are fascinating. Some kids who ought to become paragons of morality end up as troubled adults, while others who have grown up in dysfunctional families and disintegrating communities turn out to be saints. No clear, normal, or normative pattern of development emerges. Coles's response is not to reject the value of analytic scholarship but to temper its claims in the light of empathic knowledge. He says the role of empathic insight is that it "nudges theory toward human experience, hoping that the latter brings the former to life, and the former helps arrive at a persistent, comprehensible aspect of the human scene."¹⁰ Empathic scholarship rarely if ever exists in pure form—it is almost always mixed with analytic or strategic ways of thinking—but even a little seasoning of empathic thinking can radically alter the tone and flavor of scholarship in almost any discipline.

Morals, Manners, Motivation, and Vocation

In addition to describing the different kinds of scholarship that exist, it is necessary to also say something about the different ways people embody their work as scholars. Scholarship is not simply a mechanical process; it is undertaken by flesh-and-blood, thinking, feeling, active human beings. Scholarship is also inherently interpersonal; it does not take place in a social vacuum. When scholars do their work they are thus compelled, at least from time to time, to stop and ask themselves what they are doing and why. What moral limits do they or should they put on their work? How do they or how should they interact with other scholars within their own discipline or in other fields of study? What motivates them to pour themselves into the time-consuming and often difficult work of scholarship? What does it mean to understand one's life and work as an expression of scholarly vocation or calling?

With regard to morals, almost all the disciplines have developed specific norms and restrictions that set ethical bounds on scholarship. Some of these guidelines focus on the process of scholarly research (e.g., research protocols); others focus on the final scholarly product (e.g., plagiarism). Less precisely developed ethical norms relate to the dissemination of scholarship, with questions usually focusing on the moral impact that scholarship may have on those influenced by it. The classic example along these lines is the way in which the scholarly examination of the atom led to the development of nuclear weapons technology, but there are moral ramifications to the work we do as scholars in virtually every area of study ranging from art and literature to political theory and engineering.

The ethical codes and moral discussions of the academic disciplines have a major impact on the kind of scholarship that is produced, and the individual scholar's own sense of right and wrong also is deeply influential. This is especially evident in applied scholarship such as medicine. For example, we know a medical researcher in Zambia, where malaria is a massive health problem, who as a matter of moral principle will not test any antimalaria drugs on the Zambian people that they themselves will never be able to afford. Given that Zambia currently spends only six dollars per person per year on health care, this researcher obviously declines to test a number of potentially effective but expensive drugs. Perhaps those drugs would help some Zambians, but he still believes it would be immoral to use the poor villagers around his clinic as guinea pigs to test drugs that will never be available to them. Whether one agrees or disagrees with this particular scholar's sense of research ethics, the principle remains: virtually all scholars place some moral limits or moral requirements on their work. Scholarship is not a value-free enterprise.

The notion of scholarly manners points in a somewhat different direction. Scholarship is a social endeavor—everyone is dependent on each other's work—and because of that the ways scholars treat each other is of significant concern. If the best way to advance thinking on any given subject is through intelligent discussion and argument with others, then scholarship ought to be framed in ways that open dialogue rather than foreclose conversation. Clearly some degree of humility is involved in the practice of good scholarly etiquette, as it requires an acknowledgment that one might learn something from somebody else. But this is not a recipe for mere relativism; it does not require accepting every scholarly opinion. The scholar can remain resolutely convinced of one perspective, even while respecting the differing perspectives of other well-intentioned, intelligent people. Of course, this does not always happen. The theologian and church historian Martin Marty was fond of remarking to his students at the University of Chicago that one of the most important distinctions in the world of scholarship was between people who were mean and those who were not mean—between those who seemed to enjoy tearing their

peers apart in person or in print and those scholars who always respected their peers as human beings even when they vehemently disagreed with their views.

In almost any discipline, some people can be found who are truly kind and caring, while others in that field (usually only a few) are mean and nasty. A relevant question is to ask whether faith has any influence on this aspect of scholarship, and the honest if unfortunate answer seems to be that faith has a mixed record. For some scholars, faith prompts modesty in the ways they compose and present their scholarship. For others, faith seems to be the catalyst that turns simple human confidence into mean-spirited arrogance. It is not the certitude of faith that is the problem; cocky confidence is part and parcel of the scholarly world. The problem is when religious certitude (or any other kind of certitude) leads a scholar to discount the humanity of a colleague or to launch a scorched-earth offensive against some viewpoint in a manner intended to destroy both that viewpoint and all who hold it. To be sure, secular ideologies can produce this same kind of meanness, but that does not make religiously motivated nasty academic behavior any less reprehensible. While Christian scholars search to describe how faith can have a positive influence on scholarship, the flip side must never be forgotten: faith can sometimes have a decidedly negative influence on scholarship. Christian scholars need to remember that fact and always be on their guard to keep those negative influences to a minimum. The academy functions best when scholars, regardless of their fields of study and regardless of their commitments of faith or ideology, treat each other with respect.

Motivation is another dimension of any scholar's work. Scholarship requires dedication, effort, and perseverance. One does not decide to become a scholar without some clear motivation to do so. Scholarship also involves personal risk. Every act of scholarship puts the fragile human ego of the scholar—and all human egos are frail to some degree—on the line. Every scholarly undertaking exposes the ego of the scholar to potential bruising. Even the most mature scholars feel some twinge of fear when they release a new work.

Because scholarship is such hard work and so risky, only some college and university faculty take up the challenge. Recent studies have shown that a significant number of college and university professors—around 25 percent—have never published a peer-reviewed essay, book chapter, or monograph.¹¹ The latest national survey found that 41 percent of full-time faculty had not published a single article in the previous three years and that 54 percent had not authored or edited a scholarly book or research report in that same time period. More than a quarter of full-time faculty reported that they were not currently engaged in any scholarly work that would lead to a publication, exhibit, or performance.¹² While this data is only a rough measure of scholarly activity, these statistics are still revelatory. The work of scholarship demands significant amounts of time and energy, and only some academicians are willing to do it.

To a certain degree this is a simple matter of priorities—we can only do so much in a twenty-four-hour day—but that is not the only factor. The greater hindrance to scholarship may be fear of failure.

Fear of failure can be mitigated to some degree if a scholar is motivated by an explicit sense of vocation. To have a vocation is to live one's life in terms of a calling that is bigger than oneself. It is to view one's life in terms of an overall trajectory (rather than as a series of separate and distinct successes or failures) aimed at goals that transcend any one person's ability ever to achieve them all. One can have a vocation to work for justice, or to produce beauty, or to help those who are in trouble, or to preserve the environment, or to advance human knowledge, or to affect the world for good in any number of other ways. What makes something a vocation is not the specific activity but the way in which that activity is both understood in larger context and carried out in actual practice. Vocation is scholarship embodied in the form of commitment to higher ideals and service to others. The psychologist James Fowler has suggested that having a sense of vocation affects people in several ways.¹³ First, it can exempt them from competition with others because they know they are working toward goals they cannot achieve on their own. Cooperation with others is what is required, not competition. Second, it can protect them, at least to some degree, from fear of personal failure because they recognize that the goals they are pursuing are much more important than their mere egos. Third, a sense of vocation can free them from the need to be all things to all people. They know what they are called to do. Finally, having a vocation can liberate them from the tyranny of time since it provides a means of prioritizing their various duties and responsibilities.¹⁴

Fowler derives his notion of vocation from the realm of faith, but a similar sense of calling can be found in other less religious sources. In this regard, the recently published *Good Work: When Excellence and Ethics Meet* can serve as a model. The authors of this book define good work as skilled activity undertaken in a thoughtful, responsible, and creative manner with the aim of serving social needs (broadly defined), providing personal fulfillment, and somehow making the world a better place. They recognize, perhaps more than many people who write about vocation, that this kind of confluence of ideals is predicated on a range of factors outside any one person's control. Good work never happens naturally, but its chances of flourishing are much greater when the ideals of the individual, the norms of his or her profession, the values of society, and the economic structures that support his or her field of work are all in alignment. But even where that kind of alignment does not exist, individuals can still transform their activity from mere work into good work by locating what they do in a larger moral and meaningful vision of life. The authors argue that "rich lives include continuing internal conversations about who we are, what we want to achieve, where we are successful, and where we are falling short." These internal conversations are to be undertaken in light

of what they call "the universal mirror test: 'What would it be like to live in a world if everyone were to behave in the way that I have?'"¹⁵

Wherever and however this broader view of life as vocation can be brought to bear on our work as scholars, the better our work will be. It will also inevitably make our scholarship more faith-full, whether that fullness of faith is understood in traditional religious terms or as a deep-seated commitment to some other set of values and ideals. Faith, embodied in the motivation of our scholarship and carried out in a manner that respects others, can transform the scholarly task from a mere career path into a lifelong vocation.¹⁶ Vocations of scholarship can and will take different forms: to seek truth and share it with others, to understand the world and nurture it with care, to cultivate a proper sense of wonder and awe at the beauty and complexity of all that is. Christians participate alongside others in all of these modes of scholarly calling, adding their particular values and views to the mix, helping to maximize the academy's overall "surplus of seeing," and hoping to gain new insights for themselves while sharing their points of view with others for their further consideration. The dynamics of the process are not predictable, but the pattern of lively exchange—this cauldron of passionately pursued academic good work—defines the terrain on which both Christian scholars and other scholars live out the sometimes conflicting and sometimes congruent trajectories of their overlapping scholarly vocations.

NOTES

1. C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959).
2. Ernest L. Boyer, *Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate* (Princeton: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1990).
3. On this point see also Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Idea of the University: A Reexamination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Pelikan affirms Boyer's definition and especially the value Boyer assigns to undergraduate teaching as a form of scholarship. Pelikan says that it is the scholar's obligation not merely to discover new bits of truth about the world but to draw connections and contrasts and to locate one's work in the broader context and currents of academic discourse. Because that is also precisely what is required in good teaching, Pelikan concludes: "The professor comes to [the] obligation of the scholar far better prepared after having first taken [those tasks] on as an undergraduate teacher" (95).
4. See Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), and *Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Practice* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
5. Howard Gardner, *Intelligence Reframed: Multiple Intelligences for the 21st Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 48, 60. About existential intelligence, in particular, Gardner says: "Despite the attractiveness of a ninth intelligence . . . I am not adding existential intelligence to the list. I find the phenomenon perplexing enough and the

distance from the other intelligences vast enough to dictate prudence—at least for now. At most, I am willing, Fellini-style, to joke about ‘8½ intelligences’” (66).

6. Stephen Wolfram, *A New Kind of Science* (Champaign, Ill.: Wolfram Media, 2002).

7. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 164.

8. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (New York: Free Press, 1957), 103.

9. Martha C. Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 283. We are largely following Craig Dykstra's interpretation of Nussbaum's views as he explicates them in *Growing in the Life of Faith: Education and Christian Practices* (Louisville, Ky.: Geneva Press, 1999). See especially chapter 10, “Love's Knowledge and Theological Education,” 141–42.

10. Robert Coles, *The Moral Life of Children* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), p. 126.

11. Boyer, *Scholarship Reconsidered*, table A-19, 103.

12. 1997 National Survey of Full-Time Faculty conducted by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Unpublished data obtained via e-mail (July 3, 2002) from Alexander C. McCormick of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

13. James W. Fowler, *Becoming Adult, Becoming Christian: Adult Development and Christian Faith* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 83–85.

14. The Jesuit scholar John C. Haughey would agree with Fowler but use slightly different language. Instead of using the language of vocation, he speaks of scholarship done from what Bernard Lonergan called “the font of interiority.” Haughey writes: “Research chosen from the font of interiority takes seriously the measure of oneself, one's call, idiosyncrasies, interests, talents, and experiences. By contrast, theory is where the discipline itself is at any given time. If theory *solo* dictates research choices, one could be on the way to gaining the whole world (of comprehension, inclusion, recognition, status) and suffering the loss of oneself.” John C. Haughey, “Catholic Higher Education: A Strategy for Its Identity,” in *Enhancing Religious Identity: Best Practices from Catholic Campuses*, edited by John Wilcox and Irene King (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 160.

15. Howard Gardner, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, and William Damon, *Good Work: When Excellence and Ethics Meet* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 11–12.

16. For an insightful analysis of the vocation of scholarship and teaching see Mark R. Schwehn, *Exiles from Eden: Religion and the Academic Vocation in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

ESSAY FOUR

Instinctive Response as a Tool for the Scholar

Susanna Bede Caroselli

This essay examines how two different styles of scholarship can be used in a complementary manner to enhance insight and understanding. The disciplinary focus of Susanna Caroselli's essay is the visual arts, and the two styles of scholarship are the “considered response” (corresponding roughly to the “analytic” as described in the preceding chapter) and the “instinctive response” (which corresponds to the “empathic”). The specific work of art that is discussed is the fifteenth-century painting Christ on the Cross with Saints Vincent Ferrer, John the Baptist, Mark, and Antoninus. Caroselli demonstrates how faith blends naturally into our scholarship through our instinctive responses to what we study, even if we sometimes seek to deny that instinctive element.

In her book *Image as Insight* the historical theologian Margaret Miles laments that the meaning(s) of a visual image for its creator¹ and its original audience can never be fully recovered.² Even supposing the existence of a written record or other documentation of the creation of the image, scholars are bound, as is frequently observed, to filter such evidence through their chosen critical structure and their culturally conditioned perception.

The precise reconstruction of original meaning is unlikely—and, indeed, how could we know if we were successful? Certain bodies of contemporary critical thought maintain that the very concept of “original meaning” is spurious and bankrupt, but even those who posit the death of the author/artist cannot deny the expression of a culture.³ Image has immediate impact. Even visual images intended by their creators to have primarily intellectual appeal—the late fifteenth-