How to write a philosophy paper

defend your views against potential criticisms. That is, try to anticipate what objections might be raised against your views and demonstrate both that you are aware of these possible objections and that you can respond to them—more on this later.

A philosophy paper should be rationally persuasive. And if your arguments are to be persuasive, they must not rest upon unsupported, contentious claims. Instead they should ultimately rest upon assumptions that even a reasonable person of the opposing view would accept. So if, for instance, you want to argue that abortion is morally wrong, you shouldn't begin by assuming that the fetus has a right to life. Realize that such an argument would unlikely persuade anyone who is “pro-choice.” After all, the view that the fetus has a right to life from the moment of conception is precisely what most pro- choice advocates would contest. Of course, you can argue that the fetus has a right to life; you just shouldn’t assume it.

The point is to avoid making any assumptions that someone of the opposing view is sure to reject. You should think of your paper as an attempt to persuade someone of the opposing view, and if you are to have any chance of persuading such a person, you must first find some common ground from which to build your arguments. A good example of what I have in mind here is Judith Jarvis Thomson's arguments in “A Defense of Abortion.” In this paper, Thomson argues that abortion is morally permissible where the woman is pregnant as the result of being raped. Now what makes Thomson’s arguments so compelling is that they are based on assumptions that even the most extreme anti-abortionist (i.e., one who holds that abortion is always wrong) would likely accept.

Thomson asks you to imagine waking up some morning to find yourself connected to an unconscious violinist suffering from a potentially fatal kidney ailment. Suppose that last night the Society of Music Lovers kidnapped you and, without your consent, surgically connected the violinist to your circulatory system in a desperate attempt to save his life. You now face the following choice. You can remain connected to the violinist for nine months by which time the violinist will be able to survive on his own, or you can unplug yourself from the violinist in which case the violinist will immediately die.

Thomson assumes that in this situation you are under no obligation to remain connected to the violinist for the nine months. You may unplug yourself from the violinist even if this entails killing him. Now this assumption seems relatively uncontroversial; it is one that even a pro-lifer would likely accept. But from this seemingly benign assumption, Thomson is able to argue that abortion is sometimes permissible even if the fetus has a right to life, for the violinist surely has a right to life and yet it is permissible for you to kill him. And aborting a fetus whose existence is due to rape is, in all morally relevant respects, analogous to unplugging yourself from the violinist (or so Thomson argues). Thus Thomson concludes that it is permissible to have an abortion in certain circumstances (i.e., the case of rape) even if the fetus has a right to life from the moment of conception.